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A model of international banking, with a stress on manager human-capital (borrower 
monitoring) and majority-shareholder human capital (manager auditing) is constructed to 
study the impact of exogenous shocks in one country on credit creation in another. I show that 
the presence of the two cited categories of non-transferable skills in banking technology 
reduces the role of the standard portfolio-diversification motive in the cross-border 
transmission of disturbances. At the same time, this bank-specific market friction creates a 
separate channel of shock propagation, a function of bank shareholder and manager 
incentives. It can even happen that the impact of an exogenous shock on credit has a different 
sign in the “relationship” as opposed to the “arm’s-length” banking environment. This 
phenomenon, caused by the marginal effect of the human-capital management in the bank 
operation, is present in those bank branches with relatively small loan volumes. When the 
loan volume is large, the direction of the reaction of the manager-auditing bank to shocks 
abroad is the same as that of an arm’s-length lender.  
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  21. Introduction 
Are the consequences of a shock in one country on the development of another different in 
economies with a high degree of foreign-bank penetration when international banks provide 
an additional transmission medium beyond the standard financial markets? Should this be an 
area of concern for bank regulators, suggesting an approach with particularly beneficial 
effects in turbulent times? Both questions, beside the associated theoretical challenge, are of 
great practical importance for economies that are financially integrated with larger, external 
ones. 
Standard portfolio-optimization theory derives wealth allocation across assets and   their 
pricing from statistics of exogenous random factors. If a structural-uncertainty parameter of 
an economy changes, investor portfolios are shifted to reflect the new equilibrium prices of 
risk. Thus, if an international investor decides between assets in two different countries, an 
adverse shock to the asset-return pattern in one country usually calls for wealth reallocation 
toward the other. Naturally, the theoretical foundation of this result erodes quickly as one 
departs from the frictionless-market paradigm. More often than not, cross-subsidizing within a 
multinational bank is the only visible reaction to the mentioned asymmetric development of 
national asset returns. Formalization of the rational reasons behind the observed responses to 
shocks can be addressed with a toolkit provided by financial intermediation microeconomics. 
Such is the general objective of this paper. 
 
1.1 Background 
The banking sectors of the new EU member states from central and eastern Europe (CEE) are 
all characterized by a high degree of foreign penetration. The cases range from the near-100 
percent dominance of foreign-owned banks in the domestic sector (Czech Republic, Estonia, 
Lithuania, Slovakia, Hungary) to a substantial presence (Latvia, Poland). This is untypical for 
the rest of the European Union (EU). Even small open economies outside the CEE region do 
not usually show excessive foreign-bank presence targeted at servicing the local economy as 
such. That is, most of them either have a tradition of international banking activities of their 
own (the Benelux countries or Greece) or of providing offshore financial services (Cyprus and 
Malta). We are left with two exceptions, Denmark and Portugal, which host a significant 
share of banking-service providers from abroad with the conventional objective of credit 
provision to the domestic market. Both are small open economies without international 
financial center or tax-haven ambitions. Their foreign-bank penetration is mainly due to 
bigger neighboring economies: Scandinavian in the case of Denmark, Spanish in the case of 
Portugal. The exact reasons (historical, cultural, and geographical, in addition to purely 
commercial) for the cross-border expansion of bank activities are immaterial for the present 
study. Our main point here is that for small open economies neighboring a bigger economic 
area, foreign-bank operations can constitute a significant source of exogenous uncertainty on 
the domestic market. This reality has less to do with the immediate transitional-economy 
history than with economic size and relative surroundings factor. 
Figure 1 compares seven relevant new EU member states from the CEE region (Czech 
Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Lithuania, Latvia, Poland, and Slovakia), Denmark, and Portugal 
in terms of the weight of foreign banks in their respective economies.
1 We use four 
indicators––total banking-sector assets, total assets of foreign-bank branches, total bank loans, 
and loans granted by foreign-bank subsidiaries––all relative to nominal gross domestic 
product (GDP). To get an idea of the extent of foreign-bank penetration, one can compare the 
                                                           
1 Slovenia was not included since its government has not yet carried out major bank privatization. 
  3said indicators in pairs for each country. All data are for year-end 2003. When defining the 
banking sectors, we have excluded central banks and special-purpose institutions such as 
mortgage banks, building societies, and foreign trade-credit agencies. When selecting banks 
under foreign control, we choose only those in which the parent company (the majority 
shareholder or the ultimate owner) is itself a bank. All data are from BankScope. 
Although BankScope does not provide distinct information on foreign branches, the 
conclusions one can draw from the data for subsidiaries cannot be but reinforced since their 
qualitative role is hardly different.
2 For the purposes of quantitative assessment, it may be 
useful to keep in mind the relative weights of foreign-bank branches. For instance, foreign-
bank branches active in the Czech Republic in the first two quarters of 2004 accounted for 
more than 9 percent of the commercial banking sector’s total assets and 11 percent of the 
loans. One would expect similar figures for Slovakia, somewhat higher for Hungary, and 
lower for Poland and the Baltic states. Exact measurement is not important to what we do in 
this paper. 
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The well-known discrepancy of financial depth between old and new EU members is indeed 
reflected in Figure 1. Therefore, the same absolute level of foreign-bank penetration (e.g., the 
foreign-subsidiary loan-size/GDP ratio, approximately equal to 0.22 both for Denmark and 
Slovakia) can correspond to anything from the substantial, although still minority, market 
positions of foreign banks to nearly 100 percent foreign dominance. Accordingly, given the 
difference of the degree of financial depth in the old and the new European Union, our 
indicators confirm the high degree of foreign-bank penetration in the selected countries. It is 
                                                           
2 See also de Haas and van Lelyveld (2002), who have established that cross-border credit (by branches) and 
credit by subsidiaries in CEE countries expanded simultaneously. 
  4important to note that foreign-bank total assets and loan figures relative to GDP are 
surprisingly similar across the sample (with the exception of Estonia, a very small economy 
providing an example of nearly perfect regionalization, not just integration, in terms of 
banking services). An immediate interpretation is that the role of bank credit in new member 
state economies is modest compared to old EU economies. However, the most advanced parts 
of such new EU economies, namely, the ones whose ownership, financing, and production 
structures are integrated with other industrialized countries, make use of bank credit to the 
same extent as their counterparts. 
In view of the above, it is reasonable to consider the impulses, both positive and negative, 
coming to CEE economies through foreign-bank presence as a highly significant factor, one 
that influences their economic well being. We take this as a sufficient justification for a 
detailed theoretical analysis of foreign-bank activities inside any small open economy. 
In the new member states, foreign bank penetration took place before EU accession, that is, 
before the EU-unified bank-licensing system. Penetration took the form of both local bank 
acquisition and the establishment of branches. The distinction between the two forms of 
foreign presence is not critical to our analysis, mainly given the relatively big size of the 
parent banks compared with their foreign units. Given this circumstance, two particular 
observations come as no surprise: capital constraints are slack for CEE banks under foreign 
control, so that own capital or lack thereof has little impact on activities in the host countries; 
and the financial control of parent company’s over foreign-unit operations is usually quite 
tight, regardless of the representation form.
3
Due to the almost complete foreign-bank dominance over the banking sectors of the new EU 
member states, the pace and form of the financial integration of the latter has become an 
endogenous process. Given the slow growth of CEE capital markets, multinational banks are 
responsible for the most significant component of the region’s financial-integration process as 
a whole. The forces behind their lending and deposit-taking behavior thus become a major 
macroeconomic concern. Specifically, governance issues within multinational banks put to 
the foreground the question of managerial performance and accountability in individual 
country units. We intend to demonstrate that managerial human capital and incentives are 
factors to be taken very seriously when assessing the possible channels of cross-border shock 
via a multinational bank. 
Our arguments are applicable to both standard organizational forms of foreign-bank presence, 
branches and subsidiaries. Nevertheless, for our purposes it is easier to think of the foreign-
bank operation in a small economy along the branch form, that is, without separate capital 
requirements and with a centralized alternative to localized management. We try to react to 
the two cited stylized facts visible in foreign-owned bank activities in CEE economies: 
overcapitalization (i.e., slack regulatory capital constraints) and the gradually increasing 
weight of branch-based presence. Both observations indicate that the legal structure may not 
be the prime factor of relevance and that the role of banking supervision has to be understood 
less conventionally in such economies. Accordingly, our analysis can be considered as 
complementary to those papers directly addressing the organizational-form aspects of bank 
risks (Calzolari and Lóránth 2004, Dermine 2003, Lóránth and Morrison 2003). 
 
                                                           
3 Actually, there may even exist some hybrid forms. For instance, from the legal point of view, 
cooperative and savings banks of the Raiffeisen variety are loose conglomerates of individual local banks 
regardless of the country of incorporation, whereas, in practice, the headquarters has a powerful say in the 
operation of each unit of the conglomerate. More generally, at the moment there might exist a certain migration 
trend from the subsidiary to the branch structure with regard to multinational bank operations in the CEE region. 
  51.2 Highlights of the Analysis 
The multinational bank that we model faces fundamental market imperfections caused by the 
fact that it is a bank and not a textbook international investor. What makes it different is the 
presence of the twin principle-agent phenomena (bank shareholders vs. managers, managers 
vs. borrowers) that are at the core of the banking business according to the theory developed 
by Diamond (1984) and Diamond and Rajan (2000, 2001). 
We construct an environment in which banks exist for the reason exemplified in Diamond and 
Rajan (2000, 2001). Namely, banks grant loans because their managers possess specific, non-
transferable human capital that allows them to collect debt better than an outside creditor. The 
extent to which this managerial human capital is being employed corresponds to the degree to 
which relationship-banking features prevail in the economy. At the same time, a bank is able 
to attract deposits––and therewith extend the scale of its operation outside the limits of own 
available funds––only because the rents from improved debt collection are not entirely 
appropriated by the managers themselves. Part is being turned over to the shareholders and 
depositors, since the former have the ability to audit the manager-run bank, reducing the 
manager’s exclusive control over the proceeds from the loan portfolio. At the same time, the 
depositors’ position allows them to threaten the shareholders and managers with a run on the 
bank if an audit is not carried out and the human capital not supplied, as such would imply 
that the resulting revenues are insufficient to repay depositors’ claims. Thus, the underlying 
mechanism of the bank function in our model, as per Diamond-Rajan, involves the two 
principal-agent relationships. One is between the bank manager and the borrower, in which 
the manager is the principal; the other is between the shareholder and the manager, in which 
the manager is the agent. We formulate a “reduced-form” model of an international bank 
along these lines, meaning that the game-theoretic elements of manager-shareholder and 
manager-borrower interactions are present backstage. A common multinational shareholder 
employs two managers of national branches, each doing the loan-deposit business within the 
respective national borders. The shareholder audits the managers (at a cost) and the managers 
exercise their borrower-monitoring effort (also at a cost). Under these conditions, deposits are 
collected and credit granted in non-zero amounts. Then we ask what happens to the provision 
of credit by the bank branch in one country if an exogenous disturbance to real economic 
activity occurs in the other. Specifically, we are interested in the difference of behavior 
compared with a multinational investor who is not a bank in the Diamond-Rajan sense but an 
international portfolio optimizer handling all assets at arm’s length. 
The analysis confirms the existence of both qualitative and quantitative differences between 
responses to shocks abroad by the bank dependent on manager human capital and the arm’s-
length lender. Our main findings are as follows. 
1.  Relationship-based (i.e., dependent on manager human capital) and arm’s-length 
multinational banks differ in their reactions to parent-bank home-country disturbances, the 
difference in a foreign-unit behavior being related to the volume of its lending in the host 
country. 
2.  Spillovers of the home-country shocks to the host-country credit are most likely to happen 
through relatively small branches, whereas in big branches spillovers are efficiently 
blocked by local-manager incentives . 
3.  If the branch credit volume is big enough, then an exogenous reduction of the branch-
manager audit costs by the bank shareholders leads to credit expansion. 
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small volumes of loans. That is, under these conditions, the marginal effect of the manager 
effort is particularly strong and the usual international portfolio-diversification motive is 
dominated by this specific manager input motive. Therefore, the loan volume granted by the 
branch is expanded in situations where a standard investor would contract it, and vice versa. 
On the contrary, relatively big lenders, even if the role of manager input therein is prominent, 
react similarly to the arm’s-length investor, quantitative differences notwithstanding. The 
same is true for the shocks originating in a different country, that is, happening to a variable 
that does not enter the surplus definition for the manager in the country branch. To our 
knowledge, there are no other contributions to the literature on financial intermediation 
combining the Diamond-Rajan theory of banking with an analysis of cross-border shock 
propagation in the above sense. 
 
1.3 Literature Review 
The current economic thinking about the relations among bank organizational structure, 
management incentives, and credit policies is strongly influenced by the work of Dewatripont 
and Tirole (1993). These authors created a model that accommodated the roles of shareholder, 
depositor, and regulator. The principal conclusion is that regulation exists because small, 
dispersed claim holders on a bank (i.e., the depositors) are unable to coordinate their effort 
well enough to enforce adequate management decisions. However, the approach of 
Dewatripont and Tirole is not bank specific (i.e., it can be equally applied to any profit-
seeking enterprise with decisions delegated to managers). The literature directly addressing 
the special role of banks exploits the information asymmetry between entrepreneur and   
investor. Thus, Diamond (1984) explains the existence of banks via their role as delegated 
monitors of risky investment. This idea was further developed to explain the necessity of 
financial intermediaries in the form of banks in an environment where not just entrepreneurial 
effort but also the effort given to its monitoring is partially unobservable (see Diamond and 
Rajan 2000). Beside that, the systemic specificity of banks and other credit institutions from 
the macroeconomic point of view requires a structured analysis of bank financing and 
investment decisions. A widely recognized unified approach to capital budgeting by financial 
institutions was offered by Froot and Stein (1998).  
The existing theory of bank risk management mostly relies on highly stylized models, usually 
in two or three periods, that investigate the role of different asymmetric-information effects 
on organizational form and asset-portfolio composition. The underlying property of the 
modeled entity is its tendency to generate a phenomenon called “capture” (see, e.g., 
Dell’Ariccia and Marquez 2004). This is an advanced form of information asymmetry in the 
capital market. Under “borrower capture” one understands the inability of finance-seeking 
entrepreneur to communicate the project-quality information credibly to anyone but the 
“house bank.” Similarly, “intermediary capture” occurs if a bank seeking to attract depositors 
and outside equity providers is unable to credibly communicate the quality of its investment 
portfolio to anyone but the incumbent majority shareholder. Sometimes, the existence of 
capture in theoretical models leads to surprising results when the interplay with regulatory 
policies is considered. (For instance, bank-share ownership can become more risky as a result 
of capital requirements tightening, as in the model by Morrison and White [2004]. This paper 
adds another element––the regulator’s own reputation and its significance for the equilibrium 
resource allocation in the financial-services market––to the discussion.) An important object 
of study is the probability of a depositor run or bank failure (more generally, the occurrences 
of financial crises) in a dynamic perspective. These models are concerned with the long-term 
sustainability of loan and deposit markets rather than the outcome of a single strategic 
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studies the existence of “prudent” versus “gambling” equilibria as a function of regulatory 
requirements and the impact on the credit conditions. Another recent contribution to this line 
of literature is Monnet and Quintin (2004), in which not just the current state but also the 
historical path of financial markets determines their size and structure in the next period. 
The extension of the discussed framework to multinational banks, as in Külpmann (2000), 
involves deepening the analysis to the level of individual divisions (branches) and their 
managers’ optimal choices within a multinational bank. Alternatively, Chan-Lau and Chen 
(2002) derive a dependence of the financial crisis  (a reversal in the credit supply) in an open 
economy on the extent of frictions in the financial sector relative to the economic 
fundamentals. These and related papers subsume that international asset diversification is an 
important motive in multinational-bank decision making, which is long recognized in the 
literature on international finance (see, e.g., Heston and Rouwenhorst 1994). 
The specific topic of foreign-bank presence in the CEE region was covered by two empirical 
reports by de Haas and van Lelyveld (2002, 2003), which use Bank for International 
Settlements’ and BankScope statistics ending in 2000. Developing on earlier empirical 
literature mainly concerned with Latin America, these reports distinguish between the “pull 
factor” and the “push factor” associated with foreign-bank penetration. The former 
corresponds to the reduction in credit by foreign banks in reaction to economic downturns and 
financial crises in the host country (and its expansion during booms), the latter deals with 
reaction to the home-country situation of the parent bank. There is a positive push effect when 
home-country disturbances result in a credit contraction by foreign units (the parent bank is 
concerned with balance-sheet repair). A negative push factor is present when home 
difficulties lead foreign units to lend more (the parent bank follows the standard portfolio-
diversification logic). For the CEE, de Haas and van Lelyveld find that the pull factor is 
absent: foreign banks did not cut credit during host-country troubles. On the other hand, they 
do find a negative push effect: there is a significant negative relationship between home-
country economic growth and host-country credit by foreign banks. This finding is supported 
by informal evidence from other sources. Given that the workings of the push factor have 
implications for both macroeconomic and financial stability, the model to be developed here 
will be primarily used to study the spillover of home-country shocks through dependent bank 
units in the host country. 
Recently, international bank-regulation issues also received attention. Holthausen and Rønde 
(2004) study the impact of the home- and the host-country supervisor information exchange 
on bank-closure decisions. Lóránth and Morrison (2003) examine the role of national deposit 
insurance and evaluate its impact on the decision making of multinational banks. They also 
link the result about cross-border investment choices to the existence of a multinational bank 
channel for financial contagion. Calzolari and Lóránth (2004) extend the analysis to include a 
welfare-optimizing regulator and show how the regulatory stance is influenced by the chosen 
representative form (branch vs. subsidiary) of the foreign bank. Morrison and White (2004) 
endow the regulator with an additional ability (beside bank-licensing and capital-adequacy 
requirements), asset auditing, and examine the impact of this additional tool on the 
phenomena of adverse selection and moral hazard in the banking sector. Their model allows 
for multiple equilibria, some of which entail confidence crisis in the banking sector and a 
corresponding welfare-reducing decrease in project financing. 
Although we do not model the regulator explicitly, the problems discussed in this last strain of 
literature have a direct bearing on this paper. By focusing on risk grouping in accordance with 
the country of origin, we are able to concentrate the analysis on international financial 
intermediaries co-existing with national regulators. In our approach, the capture effect is 
  8studied as friction between entrepreneurs, banks, and investors of individual countries (in fact, 
we are thereby also able to address the question of home bias in the bank-loan markets with 
the twin capture effects). Given the focus of this paper on the credit-creation aspects of the 
banking industry, explicit coverage of bank failure and closure alternatives is not essential. 
Hence, there are no bankruptcies in our model. Otherwise, after a formal description of bank 
asset and liability transformation under bankruptcy, one would have to conduct the very same 
analysis of deposit collection and lending under new owners and managers. Therefore, we 
model banks and bank managers, whose preferences exclude a termination of activity for 
reason of a depositor run or a regulatory action (both are only present as latent threats). 
Regulation, in our understanding, is a set of legal norms that co-determine a bank’s 
shareholder and managers’ preference structures. Supervision, on the other hand, is 
understood as a way for policymakers to influence the parameters of banks’ day-to-day 
operations, such as the opportunity cost of capital or sensitivity to liquidity fluctuations. One 
of the consequences of our model is a case for a regulatory policy that facilitates the bank 
portfolio audit for its shareholders and depositors. In this way, the domestic banking regulator 
may support an equilibrium with a high degree of specific manager human capital in 
multinational bank branches under his jurisdiction. Suppose there is a sudden reversal in the 
credit-creation process owing to a real or financial disturbance in the home country of the 
parent bank or banks. If, as is the case in the small open economies discussed earlier, too 
many host-country borrowers depend on loans from foreign-controlled bank, this reversal will 
have a macro-impact, with possible subsequent implications for the financial health of the real 
sector, that is, financial stability. The domestic regulator is not in the position to change the 
behavior of the incumbent foreign-controlled bank. However, a proper regulatory stance can 
encourage the entry of other banks able to provide the missing funds. In this respect, we 
suggest that one key criterion of the regulatory and supervisory policies is their ability to 
reduce bank managers’ monitoring costs. This will reduce agency problems, particularly in 
foreign-bank branches that manage large loan volumes, that is, those with the highest degree 
of systemic significance. As a result, these branches will no longer act as transmitters of 
disturbances from the parent-bank countries to the domestic credit market. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the model. Section 3 
presents the main results concerning the reaction of foreign branches to international shocks. 
Section 4 indicates possible extension of the analysis to the problems of regulatory policies 
and exchange rate risks. Section 5 concludes. Proofs of the technical statements are collected 
in the Appendix. 
 
2. The Model 
There are two countries in our model, each offering one general investment opportunity and 
another opportunity to grant non-traded loans. There is also a risk-free money-market deposit 
opportunity. An international financial institution is owned by a representative shareholder. 
She operates branches in both countries and can, in addition to investing her own funds in 
either of these assets, collect deposits from the public. Each branch faces a supply of deposits 
within the country, which is an upward-sloping function of the deposit rate that it offers. 
Some deposits may be withdrawn upon the payment of interest due to an unspecified liquidity 
shock. 
To perform the loan and deposit business, the shareholder usually hires a manager for the 
bank branch. The branch manager possesses an endowment of non-transferable human 
capital, allowing him to collect a rate of return on the loans in excess of the baseline arm’s-
  9length rate that can be extracted from the same borrowers by an outside investor in the 
market. He is remunerated by a fee paid out of the branch’s proceeds. 
There are two dates, the first when the capital allocation, deposit collection, and lending takes 
place, and the second when returns are realized and interest and fees paid. The shareholder 
and the managers are risk-averse expected-utility maximizers. The uncertainties at date 0 exist 
with regard to six variables (three in each country): return on loans, return on outside assets, 
and deposit/withdrawal rate. 
 
2.1 Bank Balance Sheet and Cash Flows 
The general notational convention to be employed throughout the paper is the use of 
uppercased letters for the home-country variables and lowercased letters for foreign-country 
ones. 
Let C, D, X
0, and X be, respectively, shareholder own funds (capital), deposits, cash holdings, 
and granted loans, for the home-country branch. There are opportunity costs of capital equal 
to the rate of return, R
C, on domestic outside assets. The interest rate on deposits is R
D, and 
the random deposit/withdrawal rate at date 1 is Ξ. Cash earns the risk-free money-market rate 
of return, R
0, whereas the loans earn  a risky rate of return R. This means that the date-1 
domestic wealth of the bank shareholder is equal to: 
) 1 ( ) ( ) 1 ( ) 1 (
0 0 C D R C R D R X R X W + − Ξ + − + + + = . 








0 be the excess returns on loans, deposits, and outside 
assets over the risk-free rate.
4 Given the bank branch balance-sheet identity C+D=X
0+X, the 
expression for domestic wealth can be rewritten as: 
C D CY DY XY W − + = .                                                  (1) 
Analogously, the cash wealth of the foreign branch at date 1 is: 
c d cy dy xy w − + = .                                                         (2) 
To keep the model complexity under control, we do not model exchange-rate risks separately, 
but offer a few comments concerning their role in Section 4. For the moment, the shareholder 
gross cash wealth at date 1 coming from both bank branches is simply W
S=W+w. From this, 
one shall subtract the manager fees and the costs of the manager audit. The formation 
mechanism of both is described next. 
 
2.2 Shareholder-manager Interaction 
For definiteness, we describe the manager fees and audit costs for the home-country branch; 
the foreign-branch results are obtainable by a simple change in notation. 
If the loan portfolio represented by X were held by an outside investor without any particular 
knowledge of, or relationship with, the involved borrowers, the date 1-excess return on it 
would be a constant mean V plus a zero-mean normal noise. The branch manager can do 
                                                           
4 If all deposits were claimed back at date 1, we would have Ξ=1 and Y
D=R
0-R
D. However, we should 
think of a typical case when only a fraction of deposits is withdrawn and, accordingly, Ξ is a random variable 
distributed around a mean value substantially below unity. 
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H>0. Then, the return becomes: 
X H F Y ε + = ) (,  
where the disturbance ε
X is normal, with zero mean and standard deviation σX. Here, F is a 
strictly increasing and strictly concave function, with F(0)=V and the limit at infinity equal to 
V
H>V.
5 The managerial effort is costly, the cost function,  ) (H H Φ a , being strictly 
increasing and convex, with Φ(0)=0. Thus, the attainable mean return on the loan portfolio 
varies with the manager’s effort between V and V
H, the maximum value being possible only at 
infinite cost. 
If the shareholder’s control over the branch were at the outside-investor level, she would 
consider Y a random variable with the low mean V: Y=V+ε
X+ε
S. The additional (compared 
with the manager) noise ε
S is assumed zero-mean normal with variance σS, independent of ε
X 
and all other sources of uncertainty. The shareholder can spend the amount of pecuniary and 
non-pecuniary resources B in order to audit the manager’s activities in the branch. One effect 
of the audit is the shareholder’s ability to reduce her bias in the knowledge of Y, similarly to 
the manager. The other effect is her enhanced ability to collect on risky loans in the event she 
dismisses the manager and runs the branch directly. The enhanced collection ability is a 
function of the audit resources per unit of loan, A=B/X. If the manager is fired, the 









⎛ = , 
with G being a strictly increasing and strictly concave function, with G(0)=V and the limit at 
infinity equal to V
S∈(V,V
H). The shareholder revenue must be subsequently reduced by the 
audit cost, which is assumed to be a strictly increasing convex function K of B, with K(0)=0. 
Of course, the balance-sheet decisions  X
~ and  , taken by the shareholder acting alone, as 




, would be different from the ones 
following from the manager’s decisions (plain symbols with no tildas; the difference will be 
characterized shortly). We shall call the hypothetical values  X
~
and   (and the two 
corresponding values for the foreign-country branch) the shareholder’s substitute portfolio 
choices. Note that the manager has no authority over the shareholder’s own funds allocated to 
the branch. Therefore, we can think about the C variable as being set by the shareholder in 
advance of the manager-shareholder negotiations over recompense and thus not entering the 
bargaining process. The shareholder decides rationally upon the C-value in anticipation of the 
negotiation outcome (see also Section 2.3). 
D
~
The shareholder’s inability to fully replace the manager is expressed, first, by the inequality 
V
S<V
H, and, second, by the presence of additional noise, ε
S, in the return. Nevertheless, the 
possibility to audit allows the shareholder to threaten the manager with dismissal should he 
decide to claim the whole rent on the debt-collection ability for himself, cutting out the bank 
owner. With the audit, a part of the rent is turned over to the shareholder and another part to 
                                                           
5 One can think of the “true” potential return on X as an unobservable value. By employing his human 
capital, the branch manager obtains a noisy signal about the potential return. The signal is downward biased, but 
the bias decreases with H. Note the difference of this interpretation and the one-in-many microfinance models, 
where the signals are unbiased and only their precision varies. Our understanding is closer to the discrete version 
of Girsanov’s probability: better signals mean a more precise knowledge of the drift, whereas the diffusion 
magnitude stays the same. 
  11the depositors. The latter effect arises since the depositors are offered a rate of interest 
sufficient to attract them to the bank. 
We assume that in the course of mutual negotiations, the shareholder makes known to the 
manager the resources, B, to be allocated to audit. The manager then selects his fee, M, so that 
the shareholder is indifferent to keeping or dismissing the manager: 
) (
~
) ( B K W M B K W − = − − , which is equivalent to requiring the fee, which is lower by one 
cent lower than 
W W M
~
− = .                                                            (3) 
Any fee higher than the left-hand side of Equation (3) would see the manager dismissed, since 
the shareholder would do better acting in his place herself. A lower fee would be suboptimal 
for the manager unless he was exposed to competition from others with human capital linked 
to the same loan portfolio, which is highly improbable. Namely, we associate the manager’s 
special skills with his knowledge about the repayment ability of the set of borrowers that 
comprise the loan portfolio of the branch. In other words, managers have an enhanced ability 
to collect on debt because they act in a relationship-banking environment. Altogether, 
Equation (3) is just one of the many existing ways to describe the shareholder-manager 
negotiation outcome, which was chosen for its computational tractability.
6
The agreed managerial fees are inputs into the optimization programs solved by the two 
managers and the shareholder. 
 
2.3 Optimal Investment, Audit, and Managerial Effort 
We shall consider the case when the shareholder maximizes the expected negative 
exponential utility with risk-aversion parameter γ of the date-1 cash wealth, W
S=W+w, net of 
manager fees and audit costs: 
() {} [] ) ( ) ( exp b k B K m M w W E − − − − + − − γ . 
 
Each manager maximizes his own expected negative exponential utility of the fee, net of the 
effort costs, that is,  ( ) { } [ ] ) (
~
exp H W W E
M Φ − − − − γ  and  ( ) { } [ ] ) ( ~ exp h w w E
m φ γ − − − −  for the 
home- and the foreign-branch manager ,respectively. The three risk-aversion parameters γ, γ
M, 
andγ
m need not be equal to one another. 
The risk-aversion assumption for all agents in the model is used to generate non-trivial 
demands for different assets and allows one to analyze portfolio shifts in response to shocks. 
For the same reason, the asset returns contain random noises even though the latter are 
unaffected by the relationship-banking degree, that is, they are seemingly unrelated to the 
central object of our interest. As mentioned before, our concept of informational frictions in 
the loan market utilizes the effect of biased information (errors in the perceived mean values) 
rather than imprecise information (higher than efficient variances). All the same, non-zero 
variances are needed in the present setting to prevent the problem from becoming vacuous. 
 
                                                           
6 For instance, in Diamond and Rajan, 2000, the bargaining power is split at random between the 
shareholder and the manager, each of them given, with a ½-probability, the right to make a take-it-or-leave-it 
offer to the other. In this paper, we renounce the possibility to explore the available game-theoretic ramifications 
of the manager-shareholder relation. 
  12Negative exponential utility has been selected for the sake of explicitness and ease of 
computation, although qualitatively similar results––albeit with a messier algebra––are 
obtainable for more general forms of the utility function. 
Manager’s choices 
For definiteness, we formulate below the result for the foreign-branch manager, the domestic-
manager results being recoverable by change of notation. 
The manager’s choice variables are effort h, credit volume x, and the deposit rate r
d. Let 
 be the public supply of deposits as a strictly increasing function of the deposit 
rate, and    its inverse. Formally, optimizing with respect to r
) (
d d r r π a
) (d t d a
d and d by the manager 
is equivalent. The manager and the shareholder will be assumed to optimize the deposit 
volume as monopolists, taking the inverse deposit-supply function t into account. The choice-
theoretic background of the bank-depositor interaction is not central to the subject of this 
paper and is left outside its scope.  
Recall that the manager takes the capital allocated to the branch, c, as well as the “tilda 
variables” (the values of d
~
 and  x ~  that would be set by the shareholder if she decided to act 




d]= , and analogously for the excess 
return on the outside investment (or the shareholder’s effective opportunity cost of capital in 
the foreign country), y
2
d σ
c. The correlation coefficient between ε
x and ε
d will be denoted ρdx. 
Then, the manager’s optimal choices of x, d, and h can be characterized as follows: 
() ( )
m dx x d x
h f
d d x x
γ
ρ σ σ σ




d dx x d
d t d d n
d d x x
γ
σ ρ σ σ
) ( )
~
( ~ ~ 2 ′ − −
= − + − ,                                   (4b) 
) ( ) ( h h f x φ′ = ′ .                                                         (4c) 
This fact is an immediate consequence of the standard negative exponential utility 
maximization results. 
Two observations can be made immediately by inspecting the first-order condition (FOC) of 
optimality (Equations 4a–4c). 
First, looking at Equation (4c), which is valid for effort levels h≥0, one can infer the minimal 
level of loans justifying the manager human-capital involvement in the branch, namely, 
) 0 ( / ) 0 ( φ′ ′ = f x . That is, the relationship banking will be entertained by the foreign branch 
only for  x x >  (a similar threshold value exists for the domestic branch as well). 
Second, Equations (4a) and (4b) demonstrate that the branch balance sheet, characterized by 
the triplet (c, d, x) or (c,  d
~
, x ~ ), looks different with and without manager participation, even 
if the shareholder’s benefit is the same in both cases. Specifically, the difference between the 
levels of granted credit is: 






′ − − −
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ρ σ γ ) .                       (5) 
 
  13One should think of the right-hand side of Equation (5) as a typically positive value that 
shows by how much the manager must increase the size of the branch loan portfolio, 
compared with the hypothetical shareholder-management situation, in order to earn a positive 
fee. 
Shareholder’s choices 
Because the shareholder knows the rules as per Equation (3), according to which the manager 







d r ~ ,  x ~ , B, and b to maximize the expected negative exponential utility of the random 
variable: 
) ( ) ( ~ ~ ~ ~
) ( ) (
~
b k B K z x y d cy Z X Y D CY b k B K W
d c D C S − − + + − + + − = − − . 
The latter expression is the cash wealth of the bank at date 1 less the audit expenditures in 






-, and x ~ -values that the shareholder optimizes are 
substitute, that is, they are not applied as long as the managers retain their jobs. On the 
contrary, the capital values C and c, as well as the audit expenditures B and b, in the 
shareholder’s program are the ones to be actually implemented, as they are not co-determined 
by managers. 
The shareholder’s program can be equivalently solved for audit-per-unit-of-credit 
expenditures A=B/ X
~ , a=b/ x ~  instead of B and b. We will employ the following convention 
for notational simplicity: 
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elasticities of deposit supply by the public  in the home and the foreign country. Further, let us 
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Its components are mean excess returns of assets from the shareholder’s perspective, adjusted 
for supply-elasticity effect in the case of deposits and for the marginal effect of auditing the 
managers in the case of loans. Also, let Ω be the covariance matrix of the random vector 
[ ]
s x d c S X D C ε ε ε ε ε ε ε ε + − + − , , , , , . Finally, denote by J
~
 the column vector of the 








x d c X D C J =  Then the following necessary and 
sufficient first-order conditions of optimality can be easily derived from standard results on 




= ⋅ Ω ,                                                                 (6a) 
)
~
( ) ( A X K A G ′ = ′ ,                                                            (6b) 
) ~ ( ) ( a x k a g ′ = ′ .                                                              (6c) 
In the absence of an audit, Equation (6a) would be a standard portfolio-optimization result for 
a risk-averse investor with negative exponential utility of wealth. That is, a banker who 
operates both branches as an arm’s-length deposit-and-loan businesses, sets own capital, 
deposit, and loan volumes on the basis of excess return statistics of the six existing risky 
  14assets: their means and the covariance structure.
7 In Section 3 we analyze the difference that 
the twin market imperfections of the banking business makes in terms of lending decisions. In 
particular, we are interested in the different reactions of the multinational bank to external 
shocks compared with the arm’s-length benchmark. 
 
3. External Shocks and Credit Creation 
As the results of Sections 2.2 and 2.3 indicate, the international bank reaction to exogenous 
disturbances in our model can be decomposed in two elements. First, manager-operated bank 
branches take deposits and provide credit differently than do shareholder-operated branches 
(Equations [4a], [4b]). Second, the shareholder substitute decisions on deposits and loans are 
affected by shareholder-manager interactions (Equation [6a]). 
As this paper is concerned with the transmission of shocks across national borders, we focus 
on the impact of the home-country asset parameters, such as N
D, σD, N
C, σC, and so forth, on 
the foreign-country bank-credit creation, x. Analyzing the consequence of the mean return 
parameters, N
C and N
D, turns out to be the most straightforward. Of these two, N
D, the average 
return on deposits, allows for quite a direct interpretation: its decrease corresponds to an 
increased rate of deposit/withdrawal in the domestic economy (something like an adverse 
liquidity shock experienced by home depositors, as modeled in Diamond and Rajan [2001]). 
Interpretation of the mean return N
C can be based on the capital-adequacy policy of the 
regulator. Indeed, tightening the capital-adequacy ratio can be mirror-imaged in our model as 
a reduction in the opportunity costs of capital. 
Certain properties of the bank’s balance-sheet reaction to shocks in N
C and N
D can be 
formulated in a uniformed fashion. Namely, let p be either N
C or N
D. The impact of a small 
change in p, in accordance with the results of Section 2, is naturally decomposed into the 
impact on substitute balance-sheet variables, J
~
, and the impact on the difference between the 
actual and the substitute variables (D- ,  X- D
~
X
~ ,  d-d
~
,  x-x ~ ). We start with the former, 
meaning that the shareholder-optimality conditions will have to be differentiated with respect 
to p. 
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where tildas indicate the optimal choice of the corresponding variables by the shareholder, as 
characterized by Equation (6). Further, we split vector L of the adjusted mean of asset returns 
as follows: 
                                                           
7 Of course, the deposit volume is set indirectly through the deposit rate. However, in this paper neither 
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to separate the usual portfolio-optimizing source of response to parameter change (i.e., L
0) 
from the bank-specific audit-optimizing source, L
S. (Note that the arm’s-length banker’s 
choice of portfolio is 
0 1 ) (
1
L J
− Ω = ρ
γ
.) 
Next, to avoid unnecessary exploration of the second-order impact of p on the second 
component of L (and L











, we identify a small shift in p with a small shift of the second component of L
0 as 
such. Indeed, although the reaction channeled through deposit demand elasticity may be 
important in its own right, this reaction is qualitatively the same for manager-auditing banks 
and arm’s-length investors.
8 Our goal here, however, is the examination of specific effects 
that appear in shareholder-manager frictions. 
In short, using subscripts to denote partial differentiation, we can say that the p-impact on the 
right-hand side of the shareholder-optimality conditions in Equation (6), represented by Lp, is 
a sum of the standard portfolio-diversification impact   and the specific impact  coming 












Keeping the variance structure σC, σD, σX, σc, σd, σx fixed, we will denote the covariance 
matrix for the same asset-return noise vector by Ω(ρ). Recall that this is the matrix that 
determines, in a direct analogy to Equation (6a) but with L replaced by L
0, the asset demands 
of an arm’s-length international investor. Obviously, for such an investor the balance-sheet 
reaction to a p-shock is characterized by the equation system: 
0 1
) ( p p L J
γ
ρ = ⋅ Ω .                                                           (7) 
Accordingly, if I(ρ) is the inverse of Ω(ρ), then the sensitivity of the lending volume in the 
foreign country to a small change in N
D is proportional to the second element in the sixth row 
                                                           
8 For instance, if the deposit supply is a linear function of the interest rate in the relevant equilibrium 
values domain (see more to this case in Parametric Example 2), that is, one can write T(D)=T0D, t(d)=t0d, then 
the elastic deposit-supply effect can be accommodated by replacing the variances  ,   in matrix Ω in 












d + . This would mean a change in the correlation structure 
of matrix ￿, although a change that is independent of the role of manager human capital in the bank. 
  16of I(ρ), whereas its sensitivity to a small change in N
C – to minus the first element in the sixth 



















.                                              (8) 
 The substitute asset demands in a manager-monitoring multinational bank react differently. 
Denote by   the covariance matrix Ω(ρ), in which the third element on the main diagonal is 
replaced by  , and the sixth element on the main diagonal – by 
. Further, put 
Ω
~
2 2 2 2 ~
S S X X α σ σ σ + + =
2 2 2 2 ~






















~ = , and so forth, by obvious analogy. The result, generalizing Equations (7) 
and (8) for the manager-monitoring bank shareholder, can then be stated as the following 
proposition, proved in the Appendix. 
Proposition 1 If p is either the home country outside the investment-return mean, N
C, or the 
mean (net of deposit interest rate and withdrawal rate) return on domestic deposits, N
D, then 
the bank-shareholder substitute balance-sheet reaction to a p-shock is characterized by: 
0 1 ~ ~
p p L J
γ
= ⋅ Ω .                                                           (9) 
In particular, the sensitivity of the substitute lending volume in the foreign country to a small 
change in N
C and N
D can be characterized by: 
























.                                       (10) 
The above proposition states that the manager-monitoring shareholder reacts to external 
shocks as if she were an arm’s-length investor with a distorted covariance structure of asset 
returns. First, the variance of returns on loans (both at home and abroad) is expanded to 
include the shareholder audit noises ε
S and ε
s. It is also increased, respectively, by the value of 















, the correlation parameters in Ω
~










~  reduce the magnitudes on the right-hand side of Equation (10) compared to 
Equation (8), even if one ignores the transition from ρ to  ρ ~ in I(ρ). In short, the “covariance 
effects” play a weaker role when the bank conducts substitute asset diversification than when 
the same manager-monitoring bank conducts actual  asset diversification under an arm’s-
length approach. 
 
Parametric Example 1: Linear-quadratic Audit Costs 
To get a parametric representation of the shareholder’s audit role in her substitute decision 























for a set of positive constants, K0,  k0.  μH,  μf. We will also select a special form of the 








) ( , and similarly for G. Under these 









2 ) ~ 1 ( ) 1 ( = + + , and similarly for Equation (6b). It can then be shown that 
optimal a is a decreasing function of  x ~ , similarly for A. In particular, the range of possible 
audit-expenditure realizations (a,A) is bounded. From the same first-order conditions, we also 
derive that for V
A>K0μH, v
a>k0μf, the optimal audit expenditures are always positive. 
More importantly, we are able to make the right-hand side of Equation (6a) more explicit. 
Indeed, one immediately checks that  ) ~ ~ 1 ( ~ ) ~ ( ~ ) ~ (
2
0 a x a k v a g a a g f f μ μ + + = ′ − , and similarly 
for the home-country parameters. By substituting the latter expression into Equation (6a), we 
can transform it into: 
a a L J
γ
1 ~


















































































~ a k f
s x − +  instead of variances  ,   in the 
third and sixth position on the main diagonal. That is, the audit has changed the portfolio 
problem as perceived by the shareholder. It has increased the mean returns on loans from the 
arm’s-length levels V and v to, respectively, 
2 2
S X σ σ +
2 2




A K V H μ +  and 
2
0
~ a k v f μ + . It has also 
reduced the noise-return variances  ,   dealt by the shareholder in the course of her 
substitute management of the loan portfolio, to the extent proportional to the cube of the 
audit-expense per-credit unit. The latter effect cannot erase the variances completely since, as 
mentioned before, the optimal audit expenses are bounded. (By the proper choice of 
parameter values one can make the maximum feasible audit expenditures just offset the 









Altogether, in the context of the present example, the optimal reaction to parameter changes 
can be visualized a little easier than in the general case covered by Proposition 1. 
The actual lending decisions are made by the branch manager and differ from the substituting 
shareholder decisions. Therefore, the total effect of a parameter change shall include the 
reaction of the manager. The latter is discussed next. 
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, with h=χ(x) being the optimal 
manager effort as a function of loan volume, as characterized by the optimality condition in 
Equation (4c). Introduce the auxiliary variables 
m d d
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σ γ δ . The relative impact of the same parameters N
C and N
D as in 
Proposition 1, on the actual and the substitute loan volumes is described in the following 
proposition. 
Proposition 2 If p is either the home country outside the investment return mean, N
C, or the 
mean return on domestic deposits, N
D, then the reaction of the foreign-branch-manager-
determined loan volume,  , and the substitute loan volume,  x ˆ x ~ , to a p-shock are linked by the 
equation: 
() [ ] p
d
dx x d
p p d d t d d d t x x x q
~
) ˆ ( )
~ ˆ ( ) ˆ (
ˆ
~ ˆ ) ˆ (
2 ′ ′ − + ′ + = −
σ
ρ σ σ
δ δ .                           (11) 
In Equation (11),   is the manager-determined deposit volume. (See the Appendix for the 
proof.) 
d ˆ
Equation (11) can help us distinguish two modes of the actual and the substitute loan-volume 
reaction to a p-shock. Namely, function q in Equation (11) is typically strictly decreasing. The 
exact result, proved in the Appendix, is as follows. 
Lemma 1  If the marginal manager-effort cost function φ’ is convex, that is,  0 ≥ ′ ′ ′ φ  
everywhere, then q is strictly decreasing. 
Lemma 1 allows us to define the critical loan volume level x
* by q(x
*)=δ. For equilibrium 
values  , 
* ˆ x x < 0 ) ˆ ( < − x q δ , and the substitute loan-volume marginal reaction to a 
disturbance,  , goes in the opposite direction from   (we consider the impact of the second 
term on the right-hand side of Equation [11] to be small). For  , both reactions go in 
parallel to each other.  
p x ~
p x ˆ
* ˆ x x >
 
Parametric Example 2: Linear Manager-effort Costs, Linear Deposit Demand 
Let us consider a simple version of the above model with manager-effort costs dependent 
linearly on his effort:  h h τ φ = ) ( , with τ a positive constant. (Recall that the results obtained so 
far did not require strict convexity of the cost function φ.) To simplify things further, assume 
that the deposit demand by the public in the foreign country can be approximated by a linear 
function, at least in the range of d- and r
d-values that contain the equilibrium. Therefore, we 
take  t(d)=t0d. This assumption makes variables  d σ ˆ  and δ constants. To complete the 
parameterization of this example, we fix the functional form of the foreign-manager average 








) ( . Function q then becomes: 
3












  19The first-order condition of Equation (4c), characterizing the optimal manager effort, can be 
used to express the latter as a function of optimal loan volume  :  x ˆ
2
1
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~
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δ δ + = − .                                          (12) 
Now, being a linear combination of   and  p x ~
p d
~
 (the quantities characterized by Equation (9) 
in Proposition 1), the right-hand side of Equation (12) is generically different from zero. 
Therefore, the left-hand side must be non-zero as well. This imposes the restriction  δ ≠ ) ˆ (x q  
on the equilibrium loan volume. In fact, the range of possible equilibria therewith becomes 
split into the region of “small loan volumes,”  , and “large loan volumes,”  . The 
critical value x
* ˆ x x <
* ˆ x x >
*, for which q(x




















. Obviously, for the small-loan-volume equilibrium to be feasible, it is necessary to 
impose a technical condition, 
* x x < , equivalent to  () 2
3
2




Small-loan volume equilibria correspond to the case when the coefficient  ) ˆ (x q − δ  on the 
left-hand side of Equation (12) is negative. In such an equilibrium, the reactions of the actual 
and the substitute credit creation have opposite signs. (We are thinking of the situation when 
the deposit change effect  p d
~
 has a small weight compared to δ, for instance, for the reason of 
small correlation coefficient ρdx or the deposit supply coefficient t0.) Therefore, when the 
relationship-banking sector in the foreign country is relatively small, external shocks make the 
multinational bank manager react in a direction opposite to that of an international portfolio 
maximizer. The reason is that, with small loan volumes, the manager’s objective function 
responds very sensitively to his shifts of effort. Put differently, due to the marginal effect of 
effort (or credit volume) on the mean loan returns being a decreasing function, a credit 
contraction makes the manager look better in the shareholder’s eyes. In the region where these 
marginal effects are high (because credit volumes are low), the said motive is stronger than 
the standard portfolio-optimization motive. Consequently, when conventional portfolio-
diversification wisdom suggests expanding the loan volume, benefits from a revised human-
capital involvement  in the loan management point to the opposite, and vice versa. 
Observe that this result is valid only for shocks abroad, that is, the variables that do not 
directly enter the manager’s surplus definition. Otherwise, for example, when a domestic 
deposit/withdrawal-rate shock occurs, conventional arm’s-length investment motives typically 
dominate. 
  20The large-loan-volume equilibria (when  δ < ) ˆ (x q ), produce a co-movement of the external  
shock reaction between the actual and the substitute credit volumes. That is, the bank branch 
reacts qualitatively similar to what an arm’s-length investor would do. Moreover, according to 
Equation (12), the magnitude of this reaction is increased relatively to the substitute loan-
volume reaction (since the ratio 
) ˆ (x q − δ
δ
 is greater than 1). As was shown in Proposition 1, 
the substitute loan volume, on the other had, produces a dampened reaction to external shocks 
compared to the arm’s-length benchmark. Therefore, the overall effect, when compared with 
the case of the conventional international investor, may be either stronger or weaker, 
depending on the parameters of the model. In any event, a manager-auditing foreign-bank 
branch with a large-loan-volume equilibrium would be difficult to empirically separate from 
an arm’s-length lender based solely on its reaction to other-country disturbances. 
 
4. Extensions: Regulation Heterogeneity, Exchange-rate Risks 
As long as foreign branches of a multinational bank have limited size, the home-country 
regulator of such a bank faces a more or less standard set of tasks. Our attention here will be 
given to the host country of a multinational bank branch. The available regulatory instruments 
in this case are limited compared to the standard. The capital-adequacy requirements are 
inapplicable, and the deposit-insurance arrangements are subject to international pressures 
toward harmonization. There remains some space for discretion with regard to solvency 
criteria and disclosure requirements. In terms of the model formulated in the previous 
sections, solvency criteria can be very loosely associated with the deposit/withdrawal rate ξ. 
The disclosure rules can be naturally associated with a parameter in the manager audit cost 
function k. Indeed, the branch remains solvent as long as its end-of-period cash wealth is able 
to absorb the withdrawal of deposits. In its decisions, the bank takes into account the statistics 
of the withdrawal rate ξ. Therefore, a supervisory tightening of the solvency criteria (e.g., 
more frequent on-site inspections, more strict enforcement of reporting obligations, etc.) can 
be represented by an increase in the mean value of ξ, or equivalently, by a fall in the mean 
deposit return rate n
d. The audit-cost reduction is linked to disclosure standards in an even 
more obvious way: the more the public (and hence the shareholder) is entitled to know about 
the loan quality via mandatory information channels, the less will have to be extracted by an 
effort-consuming auditing procedure. 
Below, we give some formal observations on the host-country regulator possibilities offered 
by the two policy instruments mentioned above. 
 
Branch solvency requirements 
As explained before, the adjustment of these requirements by the regulator can be formally 
accommodated as an exogenous shift in the value of parameter n
d. Suppose that the welfare 
criterion pursued by the policymaker is in a one-to-one correspondence with some function ω 
of the deposit and credit volumes d and x. In reaction to a shock of a given size to a foreign 
variable (i.e., one of those discussed in the previous section), the regulator is able to adjust the 
average rate of the deposit return n
d by a multiple θ of this shock size. Parameter θ can be 
both positive and negative, depending on the direction of the policy response. From the results 
of Sections 2 and 3 it follows that there should always be a value of θ that improves the 
welfare of the host country. 
  21To see this, let p, as above, be the foreign variable subject to shock.
9 According to our 
assumption, and in the notation of Section 3, the marginal change in welfare is equal to 
p x p d x d ˆ ˆ ω ω + . 












.                                                        (13) 
To find out for which values of the policy-response parameter θ (Equation (13)) are satisfied, 
one needs to go through the derivations that have led to the results of Propositions 1 and 2 and 
trace the impact of θ. Compared with Section 3, the following adjustments must be made in 
the calculations. First, Equation (4b) shall be corrected to include the explicit dependence on 
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2 ′ − − +
= − + − . 
This equation must be then a differentiated wrt p in the same way as in the proof of 
Proposition 2 in the Appendix. This will produce the θ-corrected relation between   
and 
) ˆ , ˆ ( p p x d
) ~ ,
~
( p p x d . Second, n
d must be replaced by n
d+θp in the definition of vector L
0 preceding 




0 will be increased by θ in the modified version of Equation (9). This equation will 
generate the θ-corrected values of  ) ~ ,
~
( p p x d . 
Combining the two described adjustments, it is possible to obtain the ratio on the left-hand 
side of Equation (13) as a function of θ. And, given the linear nature of the involved θ -  
dependences in  , it is always possible to find values of this policy parameter that 
improve welfare. Consequently, there is always place for welfare-improving national-policy 
reactions in the solvency standard area, in the sense that national discretion dominates 
international harmonization. 
) ˆ , ˆ ( p p x d
 
Transparency and audit costs 
One possible way of representing the transparency-requirement effect on audit costs is to 
associate a policy parameter with the audit-noise variance  . Another is to assume that there 
is a policy parameter P that appears as a multiplicative factor by the audit-effort variable a in 
the cost function k. Since the workings of the latter alternative are easier to describe in terms 
of space and notation, we chose it. 
2
s σ
The presence of the multiplicative audit cost-reducing policy parameter P means that the cost 
function k has the form k(b)=kn(Pb), where kn is another strictly increasing and strictly convex 
function with kn(0)=0. The welfare consequences of the P adjustment can be analyzed in the 
same way as in the solvency-requirements case above, that is, with the help of Equation (13), 
with p replaced by P. Calculation of the P impact on deposit and loan volumes can proceed as 
before. Because audit costs do not enter the manager’s surplus definition, the P dependence of 
                                                           
9 More precisely, p is a deviation of the parameter under consideration from the initial value. 
  22Equations (4) is the same as stated in Section 3 and the proof of Proposition 2 in the 
Appendix. The difference comes up only in the response of substitute asset holdings, chosen 
by the shareholder. Namely, the last component of vector L
S has a special dependence on P. 
By using Equation (6) and the implicit function theorem, one obtains the following analogue 
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. The remaining variables 
are the same as in Section 3. 
Now observe that the last component of L
n is a negative quantity, so that the impact of P 
reduction (i.e., higher transparency requirements) on  x ~  is always positive. The overall impact 
on the actual loan volume   is as stated in Proposition 2, that is, ambiguous. For instance, in 
the “small-loan-volume equilibrium” from Parametric Example 2 (Section 3), higher 
transparency reduces the audit costs and increases the substitute loan volume, but the actual 
credit may go down (unless the impact on the substitute deposit level reverts the overall 
outcome). This happens because a cheaper audit is exploited by the shareholder in the 
“income-effect” mode, so that the audit effort is not increased sufficiently. On the manager 
side, effort is an increasing function of current loan volume, whereas the marginal effect of 
managerial effort, 
x ˆ
f ′, decreases in effort. Therefore, when the loan volume is small, the 
manager is trapped in the region of decision variables with “perverse” incentives: under any 
exogenous disturbance, he would prefer to be in a state with a reduced need for effort and a 
lower loan volume. 
On the contrary, in the “large-loan-volume equilibrium,” cheaper audit policies always result 
in credit expansion because the manager-set and the substitute credit volumes move in the 
same direction in response to shocks. 
 
Exchange-rate volatility 
The formal setting with normal excess returns and negative exponential utility used in this 
paper is not particularly suitable for an explicit analysis of exchange-rate effects on 
international investment. The problem is that a normally distributed excess-foreign-asset 
return, accounted in foreign currency, after being multiplied by the exchange-rate variable, 
should remain normal to allow the certainty-equivalence procedure to go through. However, a 
ratio of two normal variables does not possess a convenient parametric distribution, let alone 
such that would be appropriate to associate with the exchange rate. Therefore, one does not 
have the advantage provided by the expected value maximization for a lognormally-
distributed wealth, and calculations become complicated. Here, while ignoring this unpleasant 
complication, we offer only a few general comments, based on understanding the foreign 
asset returns as random variables distorted by an exchange-rate risk with unspecified 
statistical properties. 
From the multinational-bank shareholder point of view, the presence of exchange-rate risk 
means that the statistics of returns on assets that are foreign to her, that is, c, d, and x, have a 
more specialized form compared with the one posited in Section 2. Namely, if S=S0(1+s) is 
the uncertain nominal price of a foreign-currency unit in domestic-currency terms on date 1 









*x), with asterisks 
denoting the foreign-currency-denominated returns. If the foreign-branch manager is also a 










x accounted in the currency of her country of incorporation. As a result, even if 
we ignore the non-normality of, at least, some random factors appearing in the agents’ 
optimization problems in this new setting, the covariance structures appearing in the 
shareholder’s and the foreign-branch manager’s problems will be different. Due to the 
exchange-rate risk, one should typically expect a higher level of all the covariances involving 
foreign uncertainties than those involving domestic uncertainties only in the shareholder’s 
problem. This will have an impact on the substitute asset-value choice by the shareholder. 
However, this effect, which is not at all relationship-banking specific, will combine with the 
usual manager decisions, as described in Section 2.3, making the overall picture more 
involved. 
For instance, one could try to assess the impact of an increased exchange-rate volatility on the 
foreign-country-manager decisions, the credit creation in particular. For the local-resident 
manager, the exchange-rate parameters do not enter the definition of his surplus. Therefore, 
the result of Proposition 2, namely an analogue of Equation (11), shall be valid, with p 
replaced by the exchange-rate volatility parameter. This gives us, as usual, a characterization 
of the credit-volume   response relative to the response of the substitute value  x ˆ x ~ . To analyze 
the latter, one must posit some parametric form of the covariance matrix Ω−dependence on 
exchange-rate volatility. Let this be done in some unspecified way, denote the said volatility 
measure by ζ, and by Ωζ - the partial derivative of Ω with respect to this variable. Note that 
matrix  Ωζ shall have zeros in the left-upper quarter. Then, by proceeding similarly to 






, one can arrive at the following 
formula, a counterpart to Equation (9): 
J J
~ ~ ~
⋅ Ω − = ⋅ Ω ζ ζ . 
This equation would be valid for an arm’s-length international investor as well, with Ω
~  
replaced by the original Ω. That is, once again, one obtains a comparison of the reaction of 
the manager-dependent and the arm’s-length bank to a shock, with the presence of managers 
resulting in a downshift of the correlation structure in the bank’s stochastic investment-
opportunity set. The subsequent interposition of this substitute shareholder behavior with the 
actual behavior of the manager is subject to the same “large- vs. small-loan-volume case” 
distinction as described above. 
 
5. Conclusion 
The paper introduced a model of a multinational bank dependent on the specific human 
capital of the branch management. The results utilize an understanding of commercial 
banking as a business whose raison-d’être is provided by the involvement of non-transferable 
manager skills. The bank shareholders motivate the managers to employ their human capital 
by means of their own, manager-auditing effort. This twin agency-cost paradigm is applied to 
a risk-averse bank shareholder operating branches and employing managers in two countries. 
We have investigated the reaction of one country branch to a shock happening to asset returns 
in another country, and compared it to the reaction to the same shock of a bank acting as an 
arm’s-length investor. The key notion that we found our analysis upon is the hypothetical 
substitute decision making of a bank shareholder in case she decides to do without the 
  24manager skills and save on his fees. The substitute portfolio decisions are different from both 
the decisions of an arm’s-length bank and the actual decisions of the audited manager. The 
latter bases the effort and the loan-deposit choices on the intention to stay marginally more 
attractive to the shareholder than her own substitute management of the branch.  
Quantitative differences in the shock response in an international portfolio-optimizing 
environment with and without the agency problems have been found, as expected. More 
importantly, we have found that there might also be qualitative differences. That is, if the 
country is foreign to the shock, the latter can have opposite impacts on the credit creation by a 
manager-skill-dependent and an arm’s-length bank. In the model, this happens only on 
condition of small loan volumes, and the factor responsible for this phenomenon is manager 
sensitivity to effort costs. 
We also comment upon the choices of a national regulator in the constructed environment. 
Although domestic credit growth is not the concern of the financial-services regulator, a 
sudden reversal of credit to the non-bank private sector by banks under foreign control is 
likely to threaten the financial situation of many bank-dependent firms and households. In a 
small economy with an overwhelming dominance of a few big foreign lenders, this can mean 
a secondary impact on financial stability. Therefore, it is in the interest of the regulator to 
support a banking-service market with a possibly stable credit supply. This is an additional 
challenge beside the well-known problem of the pro-cyclic nature of risk-based capital 
requirements with respect to domestic banks. Moreover, in a banking sector mostly populated 
by either foreign-bank branches or their overcapitalized subsidiaries, the regulator lacks the 
possibility to act through capital-adequacy requirements. However, there appears to exist 
some space for extra welfare-improving solvency criteria and transparency-requirement 
policy measures on the national level. This means that the “level-playing-ground” regulation 
in terms of transparency might encounter opposition in countries with a high degree of 
foreign-bank penetration. 
A frequently posed question is the influence of the exchange-rate noise on the foreign-bank 
operation. The issue is not considered in full detail, but the model suggests that bank branches 
managing large loan volumes may react differently from branches that manage small loan 
volumes, to exchange-rate volatility as to any other external shock. Once again we find that, 
whereas the shareholder substitute decisions are similar to the ones of any other international 
portfolio optimizer, although with a reduced role for the asset-return correlations, the 
manager’s choices are subject to a qualitative difference if the loan volume under his control 
is sufficiently small. 
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  Proof of Proposition 1 
To prove Equation (9), one needs to differentiate Equation (6a) with respect to p. The 
derivative of the left-hand side is equal to  p J
~
Ω . The right-hand side is  , and one 
needs to calculate  . Clearly, 
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and a similar equality is valid for the last component of  . Now we need to calculate the 
optimal audit reaction to a p-change. This is done in the following lemma for the foreign-
branch audit; the home-branch result is obtained by change of notation. 
S
p L
Lemma A1: For any model parameter p, the partial derivatives of the shareholder’s optimal 
audit-per-loan-unit expenditure a ~ and the optimal substitute loan volume  x ~  with respect to p 
are linked by: 
p p x
a g a x k x
a x k a
a ~
) ~ ( ) ~ ~ ( ~
) ~ ~ ( ~
~
′ ′ − ′ ′
′ ′
− = . 
Proof: This is a direct consequence of Equation (6c) and the implicit-function theorem. The 
latter is applicable since the audit-cost function k is convex, function g is strictly concave, 
and, therefore, the expression  ) ~ ( ) ~ ~ ( ~ a g a x k x ′ ′ − ′ ′  is strictly positive.  






, we see that the result of p-differentiation of 
Equation (6a) can be written as Equation (9). 
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and observe that, in the notations of Section 3,  . So, by multiplying both sides 
of Equation (9) by  , we get 
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from which Equation (10) follows by inspection of the corresponding matrix elements. 
 
Proof of Proposition 2 
The starting step of the proof is the p-differentiation of Equation (4). Having conducted it, we 
get, recalling the definition of   and rearranging, the pair of equations: 
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  27To reduce the right-hand side of the first one to known quantities, we need to calculate the 
optimal manager-effort reaction to a p-change. This is done in Lemma A2. 
Lemma A2: For any model parameter p, the partial derivatives of the manager’s optimal 
effort level   and the optimal loan volume   with respect to p are linked by:  h ˆ x ˆ
p p x
h f x h
h f
h ˆ
) ˆ ( ˆ ) ˆ (
) ˆ ( ˆ





Proof: This is a direct consequence of Equation (4c) and the implicit-function theorem. The 
latter is applicable since the effort-cost function φ is convex, function f is strictly concave, 
and, therefore, the expression   is strictly positive.  ) ˆ ( ˆ ) ˆ ( h f x h ′ ′ − ′ ′ φ
The result of Equation (11) in Proposition 2 is now obtained by routine algebra, given the 
definition of q and Equation (4c).  
 
Proof of Lemma 1 
By definition of q and χ,  ). ( )) ( ( ) ( x x f x q χ χ ′ ′ =  Then  ( ) χ χ ′ ′ ′ + ′ ′ ′ = ′ f f q
2 . The first 
derivative of χ was obtained in Lemma A2. Differentiating Equation (4c) twice, we get the 
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Substituting the latter expression in that for q’, we see that it has the same sign as: 
() ( ) [ ] χ φ φ χ ′ ′ ′ ′ + ′ ′ ′ ′ − ′ ′ ′ − ′ ′ − ′ ′ ′ ′ ′ f f f x f f x f x f 2
2 2 . 
Therefore, the condition  0 ≥ ′ ′ ′ φ  is sufficient for the whole of the latter expression to be 
strictly negative. 
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